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I. INTRODUCTION 
A major issue facing efforts to transition from high carbon 
to low carbon (“clean energy”) sources in the United States is 
the lack of well-developed legal and policy “infrastructure” to 
facilitate this transition.1 This Article considers the lessons for 
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 1. See Conference Themes: Legal & Policy Pathways for Energy 
Innovation, U. MINN., CONSORTIUM ON L. & VALUES HEALTH, ENV’T & LIFE 
SCI., http://consortium.umn.edu/lecturesconferences/conferences/lppei/themes/
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developing such infrastructure from Australia’s recent 
experience in introducing and implementing a national carbon 
pricing mechanism. This mechanism was intended to be the 
keystone of broader national policy arrangements to secure a 
“clean energy future” for the nation.2 Although there are 
significant differences between the legal arrangements 
governing energy generation and distribution in the United 
States and Australia (for example, the latter has a national 
electricity market supported by cooperative federal-state 
laws),3 there are yet many similarities between the two 
countries that enhance the potential for cross-jurisdictional 
learning.4 In particular, both countries are leading per capita 
emitters of greenhouse gases (GHGs),5 with significant 
emissions sourced from their respective energy sectors,6 which 
                                                          
home.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2013). See generally Hari M. Osofsky & 
Hannah J. Wiseman, Dynamic Energy Federalism, 72 MD. L. REV. 773, 773 
(2013) (examining the United States energy system as a whole). 
 2. See GREG COMBET, MINISTRY FOR CLIMATE CHANGE & ENERGY 
EFFICIENCY, SECURING A CLEAN ENERGY FUTURE: IMPLEMENTING THE 
AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT’S CLIMATE CHANGE PLAN 5 (2012). 
 3. See National Electricity Act 1996 (SA) (Austl.). The National 
Electricity Law (NEL) is contained in a Schedule to this state statute. Id. at 
22–187. It is taken up uniformly across the jurisdictions participating in the 
National Electricity Market (NEM) by application statutes. See, e.g., National 
Electricity Act 2005 (Vic) (Austl.). The same applies to the legislation 
supporting institutions and the regulations and rules under the principal Act. 
See National Electricity Regulations 1996 (SA) (Austl.); National Electricity 
Rules Version 55, National Electricity Act 1996 (SA) (Austl.); see also 
Electricity Market, AUSTL. ENERGY MARKET COMM’N, http://www.aemc.gov.au/
electricity/electricity-market.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2013) (“The National 
Electricity Market (NEM) is a wholesale exchange for electricity for the 
Commonwealth adjacent areas and those States and Territories that are 
electrically connected.”). See generally REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, 
ELECTRICITY REGULATION IN THE US: A GUIDE (2011), available at 
http://www.raponline.org/document/download/id/645 (providing an overview of 
the U.S. electricity regulation system). 
 4. See INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, CO2 EMISSIONS FROM FOSSIL FUEL 
COMBUSTION HIGHLIGHTS 99 (2013). 
 5. See id. In 2010, U.S. emissions from the energy sector stood at 17.31 
tons CO2 per capita whereas Australia’s were 17.00 tons CO2 per capita. Id. 
These levels were exceeded only by Luxembourg and oil-producing nations in 
the Middle East. Id. at 101. 
 6. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS 
EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990–2011, at 3–1 (2013) (“Energy-related activities 
were the primary sources of U.S. anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, 
accounting for 85.7 percent of emissions on a . . . CO2-equivalent basis in 
2011.”). In Australia, the share of emissions produced from the energy sector 
in 2010 was 76.9%. AUSTL. DEP’T OF CLIMATE CHANGE & ENERGY EFFICIENCY, 
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remain heavily dependent on fossil fuels (coal, natural gas, and 
petroleum) for energy supply.7 In addition, both countries have 
legal systems based upon common law foundations, embedded 
within a federal matrix of national and state laws relevant to 
issues of energy production, environmental protection, and 
climate change.8 
In Part II, this Article discusses the policy background to, 
and main elements of, the Australian carbon pricing 
mechanism. The carbon pricing mechanism was introduced by 
federal legislation enacted in 2011, and came into effect on July 
1, 2012.9 Despite the scheme being in its infancy, there have 
been some indications of positive change in the Australian 
energy sector, consequent upon introduction of a nationwide 
carbon price.10 In addition, the Australian government under 
former Prime Minister Gillard vigorously pursued deals with 
other countries to link to their emissions trading schemes in an 
effort to expand the effectiveness of the carbon pricing 
mechanism.11 More broadly, the introduction of the Australian 
                                                          
AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL GREENHOUSE ACCOUNTS: NATIONAL INVENTORY 
REPORT 2010, at 28 (2012) (showing that stationary energy, transportation, 
and fugitive emissions from fuel comprised 54.1%, 15.3%, and 7.5%, 
respectively). 
 7. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 6, at ES-17 (“In 2011, 
approximately 87 percent of the energy consumed in the United Sates . . . was 
produced through the combustion of fossil fuels.”); cf. AUSTL. DEP’T OF 
CLIMATE CHANGE & ENERGY EFFICIENCY, supra note 6, at 37 (demonstrating 
an increase in emissions from the combustion of solid fossil fuels, gaseous 
fossil fuels, and liquid fossil fuels). 
 8. See generally LEE GODDEN & JACQUELINE PEEL, ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW: SCIENTIFIC, POLICY AND REGULATORY DIMENSIONS (2010) (providing a 
general introduction to the Australian system); HARI OSOFSKY & LESLEY 
MCALLISTER, CLIMATE CHANGE: LAW AND POLICY (2012) (providing an 
overview of the system in the U.S.); RONALD H. ROSENBERG, HOLLY DOREMUS 
& ALBERT C. LIN, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY LAW: PROBLEMS, CASES AND 
READINGS (6th ed., 2012); ALEXANDER ZAHAR, JACQUELINE PEEL & LEE 
GODDEN, AUSTRALIAN CLIMATE LAW IN GLOBAL CONTEXT (2012) (providing a 
wide-ranging guide to climate change law in Australia and internationally); 
Federal Oversight of Electricity Markets and Infrastructure, U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., http://www.gao.gov/key_issues/federal_oversight_of_
electricity_markets_and_infrastructure/issue_summary#t=0 (last visited Sept. 
30, 2013) (describing the federal government’s role in the electricity industry). 
 9. Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) (Austl.); see also Clean Energy Regulator 
Act 2011 (Cth) (Austl.); Climate Change Authority Act 2011 (Cth) (Austl.). 
 10. See infra Part II.C. 
 11. See Robert Stowe, COP 18 and the Future of International Climate 
Policy, THEENERGYCOLLECTIVE (Dec. 11, 2012), http://theenergycollective.com
/robertstowe/155426/cop-18-and-future-international-climate-policy. 
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scheme led to the development of a sophisticated institutional 
infrastructure for supporting the country’s clean energy 
transition, including the establishment of new regulatory and 
advisory bodies.12 With the September 2013 election of a 
conservative federal government led by Prime Minister Tony 
Abbott, this infrastructure, and the carbon pricing mechanism 
itself, may be short-lived.13 However, this does not detract from 
the lessons Australia’s carbon pricing experiment offers for the 
United States, and indeed, may lend them added poignancy.14 
Part III discusses the early experience with the Australian 
scheme and highlights lessons for other countries, such as the 
United States, contemplating legislative and policy 
interventions to promote a clean energy transition. In some 
cases, these lessons relate to promising elements of the 
Australian scheme. In other cases, they serve to illustrate some 
of the pitfalls of policy development in this field. Four key 
lessons will be discussed, concerning: 
 Establishing the right carbon price to drive a clean 
energy transition in the energy sector; 
 Designing assistance and compensation measures under 
the scheme to ensure “polluters pay” and society does not 
end up “paying” major GHG polluters; 
 Insulating the scheme, as far as possible, from politics; 
and 
 Establishing a “regulatory mix” of policies that does not 
view carbon pricing alone as a panacea.15 
II. THE AUSTRALIAN CARBON PRICING MECHANISM 
The Australian carbon pricing mechanism, introduced via 
federal legislation in 2011, represented the culmination of over 
two decades of policy debate in Australia concerning measures 
to address climate change and energy sector transformation.16 
                                                          
 12. See MARTIN FERGUSON, MINISTER FOR RES., ENERGY & TOURISM, 
DRAFT ENERGY WHITE PAPER: STRENGTHENING THE FOUNDATIONS FOR 
AUSTRALIA’S ENERGY FUTURE 100–49 (2011). 
 13. See infra Part III.C. 
 14. See infra Part III. 
 15. See Neil Gunningham & Darren Sinclair, Regulatory Pluralism: 
Designing Policy Mixes for Environmental Protection, 21 LAW & POL’Y 49,    
68–69 (1999). 
 16. This debate started with the release of a series of discussion papers by 
the Australian Greenhouse Office in the late 1990s. See AUSTL. GREENHOUSE 
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The carbon pricing mechanism is designed to implement 
Australia’s international obligations as a party to the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC)17 and the Kyoto Protocol.18 Indeed, Australia is one 
of several countries that have agreed to participate in a second 
commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol,19 which would 
place the country under a binding international obligation to 
reduce emissions by at least five percent below 2000 levels over 
the period from 2013 to 2020.20 This is a major point of 
                                                          
OFFICE, NATIONAL EMISSIONS TRADING: ESTABLISHING THE BOUNDARIES, 
DISCUSSION PAPER 1 (1999); AUSTL. GREENHOUSE OFFICE, NATIONAL 
EMISSIONS TRADING: ISSUING THE PERMITS, DISCUSSION PAPER 2 (1999) 
[hereinafter DISCUSSION PAPER 2]; AUSTL. GREENHOUSE OFFICE, NATIONAL 
EMISSIONS TRADING: CREDITING THE CARBON, DISCUSSION PAPER 3 (1999) 
[hereinafter DISCUSSION PAPER 3]; AUSTL. GREENHOUSE OFFICE, NATIONAL 
EMISSIONS TRADING: DESIGNING THE MARKET, DISCUSSION PAPER 4 (1999). 
 17. See Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) s 3(1)(i) (Austl.). 
 18. See id. at s 3(1)(ii). Australia ratified the Protocol in December 2007. 
Id. at s 5. Its first commitment period target under the Protocol, running from 
2008–2012, had a quantified limitation level of 108% of 1990 GHG emissions 
levels. See DISCUSSION PAPER 3, supra note 16, at 22. 
 19. See Conference of the Parties Serving As the Meeting of the Parties to 
the Kyoto Protocol, Nov. 6–Dec. 8, 2012, Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol 
Pursuant to Its Article 3, Paragraph 9 (the Doha Amendment), U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/KP/CMP/2012/13/Add.1, Annex I (Feb. 28, 2013). Prior to the federal 
election in September 2013, Tony Abbott, now Prime Minister, indicated his 
party’s “in principle” support for Australia’s participation in a second 
commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol but announced no position about 
ratification. See Sarah Clarke & Andrew Greene, Environment Policy: Where 
the Parties Stand, ABC NEWS (Sept. 6, 2013, 3:05 PM), http://www.abc.net.au/
news/2013-06-26/environment-policy-federal-election-2013/4761774. 
 20. See Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to 
the Kyoto Protocol, Nov. 6–Dec. 8, 2012, Doha Amendment to the Kyoto 
Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
U.N. Doc. C.N.718.2012.TREATIES-XXVII.7.c, Art. 1, Annex B (Dec. 8, 2012). 
This represents Australia’s “unconditional” emissions reduction commitment. 
Id. at 3 n.3. The ambition of this target can be increased if certain conditions 
relating to the extent of global action are fulfilled. Id at 4. Included are 
conditions that there is a commitment from major developing countries to 
reduce their emissions, maintain a binding and credible global agreement, and 
existence of “broad, liquid carbon markets.” See U.N. Framework Convention 
on Climate Change, Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for 
Annex I Parties Under the Kyoto Protocol, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/KP/AWG/2012/MISC.1/Add.2, 6 (Nov. 26, 2012), available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2012/awg17/eng/misc01a02.pdf. In October 
2013, the Climate Change Authority issued a draft Targets and Progress 
Review report recommending much deeper emissions cuts of 15%–25% by 
2020. See CLIMATE CHANGE AUTH., CTH AUSTL., REDUCING AUSTRALIA’S 
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS—TARGETS AND PROGRESS REVIEW, DRAFT 
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difference from the United States, which is not a party to the 
Kyoto Protocol and has consistently refused to accept binding 
international emissions reduction targets in the absence of 
major developing country emitters (e.g., China, India) doing 
likewise.21 
Policy discussions in Australia over domestic mechanisms 
to reduce GHG emissions from the energy sector coalesced, 
fairly early on, around the need for an economic incentive 
approach to internalize the costs of the nation’s dependence on 
the use of emissions-intensive resources and energy 
production.22 Also early on, an emissions trading scheme (ETS) 
emerged as the clearly preferred economic policy option for 
putting a price on greenhouse gas (carbon) emissions, rather 
than a carbon tax.23 An ETS controls the number of permits 
made available to authorize emissions of GHGs, with that 
number progressively reduced over time in order to reduce 
overall levels of emissions.24 Permits issued up to the level of 
the emissions cap can be traded amongst market participants, 
which facilitates emissions reduction occurring at the site(s) of 
lowest cost.25 By contrast, a carbon tax effectively places a levy 
                                                          
REPORT (2013), available at http://climatechangeauthority.gov.au/sites/
climatechangeauthority.gov.au/files/files/Target-Progress-Review/cca-targets-
and-progress-report.pdf. However, the Abbott government has indicated it will 
not be increasing the Australian 2020 target beyond a 5% reduction “in the 
absence of very serious like-binding commitments from other countries . . . .” 
Tom Arup, Tony Abbott Stifling Australia’s Climate Change Ambitions, THE 
AGE (Nov. 13, 2013), http://www.theage.com.au/federal-politics/political-
opinion/tony-abbott-stifling-australias-climate-change-ambitions-20131113-
2xfm3.html. 
 21. See S. REP. No. 105-54 (1997) (expressing the sense of the Senate of 
the conditions for the United States becoming a signatory to any international 
agreement on greenhouse gas emissions under the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change). 
 22. See DISCUSSION PAPER 2, supra note 16, at 47. The previous 
conservative federal government under Prime Minister John Howard (in 
which current Prime Minister Tony Abbott was a minister) belatedly endorsed 
a market-based approach and introduction of an emissions trading scheme 
prior to the 2007 election at which the Howard government was defeated. See 
ZAHAR ET AL., supra note 8, at 155–57. 
 23. See Nathaniel O. Keohane, Cap-and-Trade Is Preferable to a Carbon 
Tax, in CLIMATE FINANCE: REGULATORY AND FUNDING STRATEGIES FOR 
CLIMATE CHANGE AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT 57 (R.B. Stewart, B. Kingsbury 
& B. Rudyk eds., 2009). 
 24. See id. at 57–58. 
 25. This is commonly known as a cap-and-trade scheme. See U.N. ENV’T 
PROGRAMME, CLIMATE AND TRADE POLICIES IN A POST-2012 WORLD 72 (2009), 
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on the price of GHG-intensive products, such as coal-fired 
electricity, which is intended to reflect the social cost of the 
associated carbon pollution.26 
The trend towards adoption of a cap-and-trade ETS in 
Australian climate policy was reinforced by the influential 
Garnaut Reports issued in 2008 and 2011 by the previous 
government’s principal climate change advisor, Professor Ross 
Garnaut.27 In his 2008 report, Professor Garnaut recommended 
the establishment of an ETS as “the best approach for 
Australia” to reduce its domestic emissions.28 Although some 
economists argue a carbon tax offers an alternative policy 
option to ETS for emissions reduction at lowest cost,29 Garnaut 
emphasized the advantages of an ETS in providing greater 
certainty in meeting emissions reduction targets and the 
capacity for international linkage with other schemes.30 In its 
efforts to introduce policies to reduce GHG emissions, the U.S. 
government—under the Obama administration—also initially 
favored an economic incentive approach employing a cap-and-
trade ETS, although 2009 legislation to introduce such a 
scheme stalled in Congress.31 A cap-and-trade ETS was 
established by the State of California, commencing operation in 
                                                          
available at http://www.unep.org/climatechange/Portals/5/documents/
ClimateAndTradePoliciesPost2012_en.pdf. The alternative model for an ETS, 
described as baseline and credit, has been less widely used, although it 
features in Australia’s earliest ETS, the New South Wales Greenhouse Gas 
Abatement scheme which commenced trading on January 1, 2003. See 
ROSEMARY LYSTER & ADRIAN BRADBROOK, ENERGY LAW AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT 141–44 (2006). 
 26. See Gilbert E. Metcalf & David Weisbach, The Design of a Carbon 
Tax, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 499, 509–12 (2009). See generally Cameron 
Hepburn, Regulation by Prices, Quantities or Both: A Review of Instrument 
Choice, 22 OXFORD REV. OF ECON. POL’Y 226 (2006) (examining the 
advantages of various policy instruments for climate change regulation). 
 27. See ROSS GARNAUT, THE GARNAUT CLIMATE CHANGE REVIEW, at xxxii 
(2008) [hereinafter GARNAUT (2008)]; ROSS GARNAUT, THE GARNAUT REVIEW 
2011: AUSTRALIA IN THE GLOBAL RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE 171 (Wilton 
Hanover ed., 2011) [hereinafter GARNAUT (2011)]. 
 28. See GARNAUT (2008), supra note 27, at xxxii. 
 29. See William Pizer, Combining Price and Quantity Controls to Mitigate 
Climate Change, 85 J. PUB. ECON. 409, 422–24 (2002). 
 30. See GARNAUT (2008), supra note 27, at xxxii. 
 31. See American Clean Energy and Security Act, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. 
(2009). 
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January 2013.32 While market-based measures for reducing 
emissions—most likely in the form of a carbon tax—remain 
under discussion at the federal level in the United States,33 in 
the absence of climate change action by Congress, the 
President has committed to pursue a regulatory path.34 Even 
so, it is possible that proposed regulatory measures issued by 
the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for GHG 
emissions from existing sources will allow scope for states to 
devise their own implementation plans, which may follow 
California’s lead in adopting a cap-and-trade program.35 
A. A HYBRID SCHEME 
The Australian carbon pricing mechanism as legislated in 
2011 is in fact a hybrid scheme, incorporating elements of both 
ETS and carbon tax models.36 The hybrid design followed the 
                                                          
 32. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, §§ 95801–96022 (2013); CAL. AIR RES. 
BD., CLIMATE CHANGE SCOPING PLAN 30–38 (2008). 
 33. A draft Bill was released for discussion by Representative Henry A. 
Waxman, Senator Sheldon Whitehouse, Representative Earl Blumenauer, and 
Senator Brian Schatz. Press Release, House Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 
Waxman, Whitehouse, Blumenauer and Schatz Release Carbon Price 
Discussion Draft (Mar. 12, 2013), available at 
http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/index.php?q=news/waxman-
whitehouse-blumenauer-and-schatz-release-carbon-price-discussion-draft. See 
generally CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, EFFECTS OF A CARBON TAX ON THE 
ECONOMY AND THE ENVIRONMENT (2013) (report prepared by the 
Congressional Budget Office at Rep. Waxman’s request, as Ranking Member 
of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce). 
 34. See generally EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT’S 
CLIMATE ACTION PLAN (2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites
/default/files/image/president27sclimateactionplan.pdf (describing the 
President’s Climate Action Plan). Under the Plan, the President has issued a 
Presidential Memorandum directing the EPA to issue “carbon pollution 
standards” for both new and existing power plants. Id. at 6. The EPA proposed 
standards for new power plants several months later. See Standards of 
Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New Stationary Sources: 
Electric Utility Generating Units (proposed Sept. 20, 2013) (to be codified at 
40 C.F.R. pt. 60), available at http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2013-
09/documents/20130920proposal.pdf. The President has directed the EPA to 
develop standards for existing power plants by June 2015. See EXEC. OFFICE 
OF THE PRESIDENT, supra, at 6; see also JAMES E. MCCARTHY, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., EPA STANDARDS FOR GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM 
POWER PLANTS: MANY QUESTIONS, SOME ANSWERS 13 (2013). 
 35. See Jonas Monast et al., Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions from 
Existing Sources: Section 111(d) and State Equivalency, 42 ENVTL. L. REP. 
10206, 10206–08 (2012). 
 36. See Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) (Austl.). 
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recommendations of the Garnaut Reports.37 In his 2008 Report, 
Professor Garnaut recommended inclusion of a “transition 
period” with fixed-price permits in the ETS up until the end of 
2012 to accommodate uncertainty over the shape of post-2012 
international climate change arrangements.38 In the interim, 
between issue of the 2008 and 2011 reports, the Australian 
government attempted to legislate an ETS with a one-year 
fixed-price period,39 known as the Carbon Pollution Reduction 
Scheme (CPRS).40 That legislation did not attract sufficient 
support in the Senate to pass, due largely to the failure of the 
2009 international negotiations in Copenhagen to deliver a new 
climate change agreement to replace the Kyoto Protocol.41 
                                                          
 37. See Explanatory Memorandum, Clean Energy Bill 2011 (Cth) (Austl.) 
at 19–20. 
 38. See GARNAUT (2008), supra note 27, at 321–22. The Report 
recommended a starting carbon price of twenty AUD per ton. Id. at 350. 
 39. Political compromises following the global financial crisis saw the 
starting price lowered to ten AUD per ton. See Carbon Pollution Reduction 
Scheme Bill 2009 [No 2] (Cth), s 89 (Austl.). 
 40. The package of Bills included the following: Australian Climate 
Change Regulatory Authority Bill 2009 (Cth) (Austl.); Carbon Pollution 
Reduction Scheme Amendment (Household Assistance) Bill 2009 (Cth) 
(Austl.); Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme Bill 2009 (Cth) (Austl.); Carbon 
Pollution Reduction Scheme (Charges - Customs) Bill 2009 (Cth) (Austl.); 
Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (Charges - Excise) Bill 2009 (Cth) 
(Austl.); Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (Charges - General) Bill 2009 
(Cth) (Austl.); Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (Consequential 
Amendments) Bill 2009 (Cth) (Austl.); Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme 
(CPRS Fuel Credits) Bill 2009 (Cth) (Austl.); Carbon Pollution Reduction 
Scheme (CPRS Fuel Credits) (Consequential Amendments) Bill 2009 (Cth) 
(Austl.).  
 41. See Explanatory Memorandum, Clean Energy Bill 2011 (Cth) (Austl.) 
at 20. Instead, the conference produced a political agreement known as the 
Copenhagen Accord under which countries notified their own self-determined 
emissions reduction pledges. See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, Rep. of the Conference of the Parties on its 15th Sess., Dec. 7–19, U.N. 
Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1, 4–7 (Mar. 30, 2010). This process was 
formalized the subsequent year in the Cancún agreements. See U.N. 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, Decision 1/CP16, The Cancún 
Agreements: Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term 
Cooperative Action Under the Convention, Nov. 29–Dec. 10, 2010, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/CP/2010/7/Addl.1 (Mar. 15, 2011); see also U.N. Framework Convention 
on Climate Change, Establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group on the 
Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, Nov. 28–Dec. 9, 2011, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/CP/2011/L.10, para. 2., (Dec. 11, 2011). Fifty-nine countries have now 
notified non-binding emissions reduction pledges and national mitigation 
actions under these agreements. See U.N. ENV’T PROGRAM, THE EMISSIONS 
GAP REPORT 2012: A UNEP SYNTHESIS REPORT 15–16 (2012). These pledges 
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In the political turmoil that followed in the Australian 
parliament, Prime Minister Kevin Rudd and Opposition Leader 
Malcolm Turnbull were each replaced by their respective 
parties.42 The new Labor Party leader, Julia Gillard, narrowly 
won the subsequent election in 2010, but was only able to form 
a government relying on a coalition with the Australian Greens 
Party and independents.43 Having insisted during the 2010 
election campaign that her government would not move to 
introduce a carbon tax, the new Prime Minister reversed this 
position post-election as part of her agreement with the 
Greens.44 Consequently, a new multiparty process was 
established to consider the parameters for a new national 
climate policy,45 and Professor Garnaut was commissioned to 
update his 2008 report.46 
The Garnaut Review 2011 largely reaffirmed the 
recommendations of the 2008 Report, including the 
recommendation for introduction of an ETS with an initially 
fixed (and rising) carbon price, in order to promote “steadiness,” 
                                                          
and commitments did not change significantly during 2012. See U.N. ENV’T 
PROGRAM, THE EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2013: A UNEP SYNTHESIS REPORT, at 
xii (2013). 
 42. See James West, How the Carbon Tax Became the ‘Killing Fields’ of 
Australian Politics, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 6, 2013, 4:00 PM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/sep/06/election-2013-carbon-
price-australian-politics. 
 43. See Alison Rourke, Australian PM Julia Gillard Signs Pact with 
Greens, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 1, 2010), http://www.theguardian.com/world
/2010/sep/01/julia-gillard-australia-greens-deal; Alison Rourke, Julia Gillard 
to Lead Australian Government, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 7, 2010), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/sep/07/julia-gillard-australian-
minority-government. 
 44. See West, supra note 42. 
 45. This process occurred through the Multi-Party Climate Change 
Committee (MPCCC). The MPCCC consisted of politicians from the Labor 
party, Greens party and independent representatives. In July 2011, the 
Committee released its agreement on the parameters of a national climate 
policy for Australia. See CTH AUSTL., MULTI-PARTY CLIMATE CHANGE 
COMMITTEE CLEAN ENERGY AGREEMENT (2011), available at 
http://www.climatechange.gov.au/sites/climatechange/files/documents/04_2013
/MPCCC_Clean-energy_agreement-20110710-PDF.pdf; Multi-Party Climate 
Change Committee Clean Energy Agreement, DEP’T ENV’T, CTH AUSTL., 
http://www.climatechange.gov.au/climate-change/multi-party-climate-change-
committee/resources/multi-party-climate-change-committee-clean-energy-
agreement (last visited Oct. 10, 2013). 
 46. See Panel of Experts Multi-Party Climate Change Committee, DEP’T 
ENV’T, CTH AUSTL., http://www.climatechange.gov.au/climate-change/multi-
party-climate-change-committee/panel-experts (last visited Oct. 10, 2013). 
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allow firms to become familiar with the scheme, and to 
establish and test the necessary institutional and 
administrative infrastructure.47 This recommendation was 
adopted by the Multi-Party Climate Change Committee and by 
the Gillard government in legislation for the scheme.48 Under 
the Clean Energy Act 2011, the carbon-pricing mechanism 
incorporates a fixed-price period (effectively a carbon tax)49 for 
the first three years with entities covered by the scheme 
required to pay a set carbon price per ton of carbon dioxide 
equivalent (CO2-eq) emitted.50 From mid-2015, the scheme is 
scheduled to transition to a full ETS (“the floating price 
period”) with the carbon price determined by the buying and 
selling of emissions permits known as carbon units.51 Adoption 
of this hybrid model seemed to reflect an acknowledgement in 
policy and political circles in Australia that, in the absence of a 
robust international agreement for carbon trading, it is best to 
begin to effect a clean energy transition by way of a simpler, 
more workable scheme.52 
B. SCHEME DESIGN ELEMENTS 
Designing an effective ETS—although often treated as a 
technical matter—in practice is “an immensely complex task” 
involving significant political considerations.53 Design of the 
Australian carbon pricing mechanism was informed by policy 
advice from the Garnaut Reviews,54 coupled with an intensive 
                                                          
 47. See GARNAUT (2011), supra note 27, at 70. 
 48. See generally Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) (Austl.) (enacted legislation 
for the scheme). 
 49. Id. at s 100. While not formally a carbon tax in taxation law terms, 
the fixed price period is popularly known as the carbon tax in Australia given 
the obligation on entities covered by the scheme to pay a set price per ton of 
CO2-eq emitted. See Lisa Caripis et al., Australia’s Carbon Pricing 
Mechanism, 2 CLIMATE L. 583, 585–86 (2011). 
 50. See Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) s 100 (Austl.). The carbon price for 
2012–2013 is 23 AUD per ton of CO2-eq, rising by 2.5% each year for the 
2013–2014 and 2014–2015 years. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. See ZAHAR ET AL., supra note 8, at 196–97. 
 53. See Rosemary Lyster, Chasing Down the Climate Change Footprint of 
the Private and Public Sectors: Forces Converge—Part II, 24 ENVTL. & 
PLANNING L.J. 450, 454 (2007). 
 54. See ROSS GARNAUT, UPDATE PAPER SIX: CARBON PRICING AND 
REDUCING AUSTRALIA’S EMISSIONS 11–14 (2011) [hereinafter GARNAUT, 
UPDATE PAPER SIX]; GARNAUT (2008), supra note 27, at xiii. 
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expert- and public-consultation process.55 One prominent 
Australian commentator hailed the resulting scheme as 
“innovative” in its design, and a potential “model for other 
countries’ emerging carbon pricing schemes.”56 Key features of 
the scheme include its broad coverage of emissions-producing 
sectors, its provision for the use of domestically- and 
internationally-sourced offsets, and the relatively strong role it 
envisions for independent institutions in advising the 
government on the future development of the scheme.57 
1. Coverage of the Carbon Pricing Mechanism 
The carbon-pricing mechanism covers around sixty percent 
of Australia’s domestic emissions and imposes obligations on 
over 350 large emitters, known as “liable entities.”58 These 
entities are liable to surrender carbon units commensurate 
with their “covered emissions,” which are those GHGs59 
released into the atmosphere in Australia as a direct result of 
the operation of the entities’ facilities.60 Notably, only direct or 
                                                          
 55. See DEP’T OF CLIMATE CHANGE, CTH AUSTL., CARBON POLLUTION 
REDUCTION SCHEME, GREEN PAPER (2008); DEP’T OF CLIMATE CHANGE, CTH 
AUSTL., CARBON POLLUTION REDUCTION SCHEME: AUSTRALIA’S LOW 
POLLUTION FUTURE, WHITE PAPER (2008), available at 
http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/102841/20090728-0000/
www.climatechange.gov.au/whitepaper/report/index.html. The Green and 
White papers formed the basis of the CPRS, many features of which were 
carried forward into the carbon pricing mechanism. Id. at xxii. See also Panel 
of Experts, supra note 46 (showcasing the panel of experts the government 
consulted). 
 56. See Frank Jotzo, Australia’s Carbon Price, 2 NATURE CLIMATE 
CHANGE 475, 475 (2010). 
 57. See id.; Caripis et al., supra note 49, at 594. 
 58. See Liable Entities Public Information Database (LEPID) for 2012–13 
Financial Year, AUSTL. GOV’T CLEAN ENERGY REGULATOR (Nov. 10, 2013, 2:43 
PM), http://www.cleanenergyregulator.gov.au/Carbon-Pricing-Mechanism/
Liable-Entities-Public-Information-Database/LEPID-for-2012-13-Financial-
year/Pages/default.aspx [hereinafter LEPID for 2012–13 Financial Year]. 
 59. See Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) s 5 (Austl.); Greenhouse and Energy 
Reporting Act 2007 (Cth) s 7 (Austl.) (defining reference to “greenhouse gas”). 
Therefore, “greenhouse gas” includes: carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, 
sulphur hexafluoride, hydrofluorocarbons specified in the regulations, and 
perfluorocarbons specified in the regulations. See Caripis et al., supra note 49, 
at 586 n.18. 
 60. See Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) s 14 (Austl.). 
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“scope 1” emissions from a facility are caught by the scheme.61 
This means that the carbon-pricing mechanism does not 
capture Australia’s significant contribution to global GHG 
emissions deriving from the combustion of exported fossil 
fuels.62 
Sectors of the Australian economy with obligations under 
the carbon-pricing mechanism include stationary energy, waste 
(e.g., landfills),63 industrial processes, and extractive operations 
for coal, oil, and gas that result in fugitive emissions.64 Some 
parts of the transport sector are also covered—namely domestic 
aviation, domestic shipping, and rail transport—by way of an 
equivalent carbon price levied under fuel-tax legislation.65 
Emissions from cars and light commercial vehicles are not 
covered, and there is also an exemption applicable to emissions 
from fuel use in the agricultural, forestry, and fishing 
industries.66 While emissions from the agricultural sector 
constituted 14.6% of Australia’s total emissions in 2010,67 they 
                                                          
 61. See id. at s 30(1). There is, however, a special provision that applies to 
suppliers and large users of natural gas to make them liable for the embedded 
emissions in this fuel where supplied or used in Australia. Id. 
 62. See CARBON TRACKER INITIATIVE, UNBURNABLE CARBON: AUSTRALIA’S 
CARBON BUBBLE 29 (2013). These “downstream” or “scope 3” emissions far 
exceed Australia’s domestic emissions. See id. at 5. The need for governments 
and companies to account for “scope 3” emissions in development decisions in 
the energy sector has been a focus of climate change litigation in Australia. 
See Jacqueline Peel, Climate Change Law: The Emergence of a New Legal 
Discipline, 32 MELB. U. L. REV. 922, 940 (2008); Jacqueline Peel, The Role of 
Climate Change Litigation in Australia’s Response to Global Warming, 24 
ENVTL. & PLANNING L.J. 90, 100 (2007). 
 63. See Explanatory Memorandum, Clean Energy Bill 2011 (Cth) (Austl.) 
at 32. Emissions from waste in landfill prior to the commencement of the 
scheme on July 1, 2012 are exempt. Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) s 30(9) 
(Austl.). 
 64. See Clean Energy Regulations 2011 (Cth) reg 1.5 (Austl.). 
 65. See Clean Energy (Fuel Tax Legislation Amendment) Bill 2011 (Cth) 
(Austl.) at 6. These sectors pay an excise on fuel. The excise payable by the 
domestic aviation sector was set to be increased. See Cth Austl., Transport 
Fuels, CLEAN ENERGY FUTURE, http://www.qta.com.au/Content/Attachment/
aust_govt_clean_energy_future_transportfuels_factsheet.pdf (last visited Nov. 
20, 2013). Meanwhile, the tax credits available to marine and rail transport 
operators were to be reduced by an amount equivalent to the carbon price. Id. 
 66. See Clean Energy (Fuel Tax Legislation Amendment) Bill 2011 (Cth) 
s 43-8(4) (Austl.). The Gillard government proposed but did not legislate other 
measures to deal with emissions from heavy on-road vehicles. See COMBET, 
supra note 2, at 38. 
 67. See AUSTL. DEP’T OF CLIMATE CHANGE & ENERGY EFFICIENCY, supra 
note 6, at xii. 
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are specifically excluded from the carbon pricing mechanism.68 
Instead, these emissions are partly regulated under a separate 
scheme known as the Carbon Farming Initiative (CFI), which 
allows farmers to generate offsets that can be applied by liable 
entities to satisfy their liability under the carbon pricing 
mechanism.69 
2. Offsets for Compliance Flexibility 
Access to overseas credits and carbon markets are critical 
to the effectiveness of the Australian carbon pricing mechanism 
in achieving its emission-reduction targets of a 5% reduction 
from 2000 levels by 2020 and an 80% reduction from 2000 
levels by 2050.70 However, the scheme includes safeguards to 
ensure the domestic carbon market is not flooded with cheap 
international offsets derived from projects under the Kyoto 
Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism,71 or newer 
arrangements for “Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and 
Forest Degradation in Developing Countries” (REDD).72 For 
instance, liable entities are not permitted to surrender 
international offsets in the fixed-price phase of the scheme.73 In 
the flexible ETS phase, strict qualitative restrictions are to 
                                                          
 68. See Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) s 30(4) (Austl.). 
 69. Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming Initiative) Act 2011 (Cth) s 53 
(Austl.). This legislation will be retained and expanded by the incoming Abbott 
government. James Wight, A Closer Look at Tony Abbott’s Climate, 
PRECARIOUS CLIMATE (Sept. 4, 2013), http://precariousclimate.com
/2013/09/04/closer-look-tony-abbott-liberal-climate-policy-direct-action/. Rather 
than credits feeding into the carbon pricing mechanism, they will be available 
for purchase through the Emissions Reduction Fund that is the lynchpin of 
the Coalition’s Direct Action policy. Id. 
 70. CTH AUSTL., STRONG GROWTH, LOW POLLUTION: MODELLING A 
CARBON PRICE, para. 5.21 (2011). 
 71. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998). The Clean Development 
Mechanism allows firms in developed country Protocol parties to invest in 
clean energy and other sustainable emissions reduction projects in developing 
countries to generate carbon units known as Certified Emissions Reductions 
or CERs. Id. at art. 12. 
 72. See About the UN-REDD Programme, UN-REDD PROGRAMME, 
http://www.un-redd.org/AboutUN-REDDProgramme/tabid/102613/
Default.aspx (last visited Oct. 10, 2013). 
 73. CTH AUSTL., STARTING EMISSIONS TRADING ON 1 JULY 2014, POLICY 
SUMMARY 3 (2013), available at http://www.climatechange.gov.au/sites
/climatechange/files/files/reducing-carbon/carbon-pricing-policy/cef-policy-
summary-moving-ets.PDF. 
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apply to the use of international credits,74 and there is also a 
quantitative limit of fifty percent for the period up until June 
30, 2020.75 With the agreement to link the Australian carbon-
pricing mechanism to the European Union ETS (EU ETS), 
discussed further below, the use of non-EU ETS-sourced 
international units was further restricted to 12.5%.76 
The situation pertaining to domestically-sourced offsets is 
different. Liable entities may use units generated under the 
CFI—for activities that store or reduce carbon in the 
Australian land sector—to discharge their liability in the 
flexible-price phase without restriction.77 Similarly to the 
Californian cap-and-trade offsets regulations,78 the CFI only 
allows for the generation of carbon credits from activities 
conducted under an approved methodology.79 Proposals for new 
methodologies must be endorsed by an independent, expert 
Domestic Offsets Integrity Committee,80 and must meet certain 
“offsets integrity standards.”81 Since the broad span of the CFI 
encompasses a large number of activities that remain 
                                                          
 74. Only offsets specified as “eligible international emissions units” under 
section 4 of the Australian National Registry of Emissions Units Act 2011 may 
be used. Australian National Registry of Emissions Units Act 2011 (Cth) s 4 
(Austl.). This means that the following Kyoto units are permitted: allowances 
from the EU ETS, CERs from the Clean Development Mechanism, emission 
reduction units from the Joint Implementation Mechanism (ERUs), removal 
units on the basis of land use, land-use change, and forestry activities (RMUs), 
and during the first five years of the ETS, entities are allowed to use 
international units to cover only 50% of their emissions. Clean Energy Act 
2011 (Cth) s 133(7) (Austl.). Further restrictions on the type of Kyoto units 
that may be surrendered under the carbon pricing mechanism are set out in 
regulations designed to bring Australian requirements into line with EU 
criteria. See Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) pt 6 (Austl.). 
 75. Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) s 133(7E) (Austl.). 
 76. Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) s 123A (Austl.), amended by Clean 
Energy Amendment (International Emissions Trading and Other Measures) 
Act 2012 (Cth) s 79 (Austl.). 
 77. See Explanatory Memorandum, Clean Energy Bill 2011 (Cth) para. 
4.66 (Austl.) (“In the flexible charge period, there will be no limit on the 
surrender of ACCUs.”). 
 78. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 11, § 95976(e) (2013). 
 79. Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming Initiative) Act 2011 (Cth) s 27(4)(b) 
(Austl.). 
 80. Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming Initiative) Act 2011 (Cth) s 106(4)(b) 
(Austl.); see Rodney J. Keenan et al., Science and the Governance of Australia’s 
Climate Regime, 2 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 477, 478 (2010). 
 81. Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming Initiative) Act 2011 (Cth) s 106(4)(c) 
(Austl.). 
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scientifically untested and largely theoretical (e.g., biochar), it 
is critical to the integrity of the offsets that these safeguards 
are stringently applied.82 
3. Institutional Infrastructure 
Although an ETS is portrayed as a “market mechanism” 
for reducing emissions at lowest cost, all ETS in operation 
around the world have required substantial supplementary 
direct regulation to create the institutional and enforcement 
structure to enable effective functioning of the carbon market.83 
The Australian scheme followed this trend, with the 
establishment of several new institutions that reinforce the 
effectiveness and environmental integrity of the scheme. 
The body with overall regulatory responsibility for the 
scheme—together with complementary measures such as the 
Australian Renewable Energy Target (RET) and the CFI—is 
the Clean Energy Regulator.84 The Clean Energy Regulator is 
an independent federal authority, established by statute.85 The 
Regulator’s most important responsibilities include assessing 
emissions data to determine entities’ liability,86 allocating 
carbon units (which are comprised of fixed-price units, freely-
allocated units for certain industries and auctioned units for 
use in the flexible phase),87 operating the Australian National 
                                                          
 82. Keenan et al., supra note 80, at 478; see Mae-Wan Ho, Beware the 
Biochar Initiative, PERMACULTURE NEWS (Nov. 18, 2010), 
http://permaculturenews.org/2010/11/18/beware-the-biochar-initiative/. 
 83. Leslie Stein, The Legal and Economic Bases for an Emissions Trading 
Scheme, 36 MONASH U. L. REV. 192, 211 (2010). 
 84. See Clean Energy Regulator Act 2011 (Cth) pt 2 (Austl.). 
 85. See id. The Clean Energy Regulator will be retained by the Abbott 
government but its functions relating to the carbon pricing scheme will be 
removed. How the Change in Government Could Affect You, NORTON ROSE 
FULBRIGHT (Sept. 2013), http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge
/publications/104025/how-the-change-in-government-could-affect-you. 
 86. Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) pt 5 (Austl.). The collection of emissions 
data is facilitated by the National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act 2007, 
which requires entities emitting GHG above a certain threshold to report their 
“scope 1” (direct) GHG emissions and “scope 2” emissions from electricity and 
energy use to the Clean Energy Regulator. Id.; National Greenhouse and 
Energy Reporting Act 2007 (Cth) s 21 (Austl.). 
 87. Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) s 94 (Austl.). The first auction of units for 
the 2015–2016 year was scheduled to take place in the first half of 2014. See 
(LEPID) for 2012–13 Year, supra note 58. 
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Registry of Emissions Units,88 and enforcing compliance with 
the carbon pricing mechanism.89 
Another key element of the institutional infrastructure of 
the carbon-pricing mechanism is the Climate Change 
Authority.90 This body, which was largely modeled on the 
Climate Change Committee operating under climate legislation 
in the United Kingdom,91 is an independent expert advisory 
body chaired by a former head of the Reserve Bank in 
Australia.92 The Climate Change Authority is charged with 
responsibility for conducting a range of reviews, including 
reviewing and making recommendations to the government 
about the annual scheme caps, which are to be set on a five-
year rolling basis.93 The Authority also has a broader remit to 
review other complementary climate change measures, such as 
the RET and CFI, to ensure a coordinated and coherent 
approach to Australia’s climate change policy.94 The Authority 
recently completed a review of the RET,95 and has produced a 
draft report reviewing Australia’s emissions caps.96 The latter 
draft report recommends increasing the ambition of the 2020 
emissions reduction target to cut Australia’s emissions by 15% 
                                                          
 88. Australian National Registry of Emissions Units Act 2011 (Cth) pt 2 
(Austl.). 
 89. See Carbon Pricing Mechanism, Establishing a System for Auctioning 
Carbon Units, AUSTL. GOV’T CLEAN ENERGY REGULATOR (Oct. 3, 2013, 4:33 
PM), http://www.cleanenergyregulator.gov.au/Carbon-pricing-Mechanism
/About-the-Mechanism/auctioning-carbon-units/Pages/default.aspx. Press 
statements made by the Regulator’s Chair soon after the carbon pricing 
mechanism came into effect indicated that she was prepared to take a strong 
stance on compliance issues. David Wroe, Carbon Cop to Pull out All Stops, 
THE AGE (July 2, 2012), http://www.theage.com.au/opinion/political-
news/carbon-cop-to-pull-out-all-stops-20120701-21b58.html. 
 90. See Climate Change Authority Act 2011 (Cth) (Austl.).  
 91. See Climate Change Act, 2008, c. 27, § 32, sch. 1 (Eng.). 
 92. Authority Members, CLIMATE CHANGE AUTHORITY, 
http://climatechangeauthority.gov.au/board (last visited Oct. 16, 2013). The 
membership of the Authority is governed by sections 17–18 of the Climate 
Change Authority Act. Climate Change Authority Act 2011 (Cth) ss 17–18 
(Austl.). There is a requirement for Australia’s Chief Scientist to be a member 
of the board. Id. at s 17. 
 93. See Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) s 289 (Austl.). 
 94. See id. at s 11. 
 95. See CLIMATE CHANGE AUTH., RENEWABLE ENERGY TARGET REVIEW—
FINAL REPORT (2012), available at http://climatechangeauthority.gov.au/ret. 
 96. See Caps and Targets Review, CLIMATE CHANGE AUTHORITY, 
http://climatechangeauthority.gov.au/caps (last visited Oct. 11, 2013). 
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to 25% from 2000 levels with a 2030 trajectory range of 
between 35% and 50%.97 The Authority’s recommendations for 
deeper cuts are based on the need to keep pace with action by 
other countries and its conclusion that a 5% target is 
inconsistent with Australia’s contribution to the long term 
global goal of limiting warming to below two degrees Celsius.98 
The Climate Change Authority has injected an important 
element of transparency into an otherwise fairly closed, 
market-oriented process for emissions reduction. The body’s 
reviews must be released to the public for comment and 
consultation.99 In addition, the Authority is required under its 
constituting legislation to have regard to a number of principles 
in undertaking reviews and making recommendations.100 These 
include that climate change measures are “economically 
efficient . . . environmentally effective . . . equitable . . . in the 
public interest” and “support the development of an effective 
global response to the problem.”101 In formulating a 
recommendation that the Australian government should take 
particular action, the Climate Change Authority must also 
“analyze the costs and benefits of that action,” although this 
direction does not prevent the Authority from taking account of 
other matters as it sees fit.102 
For each review, the Climate Change Authority must 
produce a reasoned report which is published on the 
Authority’s website and tabled in both houses of the federal 
Parliament.103 The government is required to formulate a 
response to the Authority’s recommendations, which must also 
be tabled in Parliament.104 While the government is free to 
                                                          
 97. See id.; CLIMATE CHANGE AUTH., supra note 20, at 117. While the 
Climate Change Authority continues to exist until its authority is removed by 
federal legislation, it is unlikely that the Abbott government will accept its 
recommendations regarding a more ambitious 2020 emissions reduction 
target. See Rosemary Lyster, Repealing the Carbon Tax: Hidden Costs and 
Unanswered Questions, RENEW ECON. (Oct. 17, 2013), 
http://reneweconomy.com.au/2013/repealing-the-carbon-tax-hidden-costs-and-
unanswered-questions-73657. 
 98. See CLIMATE CHANGE AUTH., supra note 20, at 118–19. 
 99. Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) ss 288(6), 289(7), 290(6), 291(6) (Austl.). 
 100. Climate Change Authority Act 2011 (Cth) s 12 (Austl.). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) s 292(4)–(5) (Austl.). 
 103. Id. at s 292(1)–(2). 
 104. Id. at s 292(7). 
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ignore the Authority’s recommendations, these provisions 
nonetheless “provide some measure of transparency” to 
decision-making on issues such as setting of the scheme cap, as 
well as assurance that government decisions “will reflect sound 
policy.”105 
C. PROMISING DEVELOPMENTS 
The Australian carbon pricing mechanism has been in 
operation for over a year, and there are some tentative signs 
that it has had a positive impact on the energy sector and 
Australia’s domestic emissions.106 One of the underlying 
rationales of the mechanism was that putting a price on carbon 
would lead to a decline in high-carbon energy use, such as coal-
fired power, as this becomes more expensive relative to cleaner 
energy sources (natural gas and renewables).107 There is some 
early data indicating a decline in coal use for energy 
production, although it is difficult to determine the extent to 
which this is attributable to introduction of the carbon pricing 
mechanism as opposed to non-carbon price-related policies and 
electricity cost increases.108 
For instance, in November 2012, the national electricity 
market regulator—the Australian Energy Market Operator 
(AEMO)—released a report on the impact of the carbon price on 
wholesale electricity and gas markets on the Australian 
eastern coast over the first few months of operation of the 
                                                          
 105. ZAHAR ET AL., supra note 8, at 193. 
 106. Jenny Riesz & Roger Dargaville, Is Carbon Pricing Reducing 
Emissions?, THE CONVERSATION (July 1, 2013, 7:06 AM), 
http://theconversation.com/is-carbon pricing-reducing-emissions-15562. The 
Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO) forecast that electricity demand 
across the National Electricity Market for 2013–2014 will be 2.4% lower than 
its previous 2012 forecast. AUSTL. ENERGY MKT. OPERATOR, 2013 NATIONAL 
ELECTRICITY FORECASTING REPORT, at iii (2013), available at 
http://www.aemo.com.au/Electricity/Planning/Forecasting/National-
Electricity-Forecasting-Report-2013. 
 107. See Riesz & Dargaville, supra note 106. 
 108. See id.; David Mark, Energy Demand Forecasts Fall, ABC NEWS PM, 
(June 28, 2013, 6:45 PM), http://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2013/
s3792200.htm. The AEMO has also cautioned about extrapolating results from 
a short time period. AUSTL. ENERGY MKT. OPERATOR, CARBON PRICE—
MARKET REVIEW 3 (2012), available at http://www.aemo.com.au/Electricity/
Resources/Reports-and-Documents/Carbon-Price-Market-Review. 
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scheme.109 The AEMO reported that hydro generation 
increased its market share by nearly two percent over this 
period (8.4% to 10.2%), whereas coal-fired generation’s share 
decreased (black coal down from 53% to 51.1% and brown coal 
from 24.1% to 23.3%).110 In addition, the carbon dioxide 
equivalent intensity index—which measures average tons of 
CO2-eq per megawatt hour of generation—also decreased over 
the same period by 7.6%.111 Former Climate Change Minister 
Greg Combet was quick to seize on these figures, together with 
the closure or phasing-down of around 3000 megawatts (MW) 
of high-polluting electricity generation capacity, as evidence of 
the effectiveness of the carbon pricing mechanism.112 “The 
carbon price is a key driver of these changes,” he stated, 
although acknowledging “it is not the only factor at work.”113 
There are also emerging examples of clean energy 
technological innovation that appear to be tied to introduction 
of the carbon price. One example is the approval of a CFI 
methodology for manure management at piggeries.114 The 
methodology allows the generation of credits from the capture 
of methane—a potent GHG—from swine waste ponds. Farmers 
can then flare the captured methane to produce less 
greenhouse-potent CO2 or go further and use the methane to 
provide on-farm energy to run equipment and heating.115 CFI 
                                                          
 109. AUSTL. ENERGY MKT. OPERATOR, CARBON PRICE–MARKET REVIEW 
(2012), available at http://www.aemo.com.au/Electricity/Resources/Reports-
and-Documents/Carbon-Price-Market-Review. 
 110. Id. at 3. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Lenore Taylor, Carbon Tax Contributes to Emissions Drop, SYDNEY 
MORNING HERALD, Oct. 18, 2012, http://www.smh.com.au/data-point/carbon-
tax-contributes-to-emissions-drop-20121017-27rl6.html. 
 113. Id. 
 114. See, e.g., Australia: First Piggery to Earn Carbon Credit, PIG 
PROGRESS (Oct. 26, 2012), http://www.pigprogress.net/Growing-Finishing/
Environment/2012/10/Australia-First-piggery-to-earn-carbon-credits-
1093348W/. There are two methodologies approved for destruction of methane 
generated from manure in piggeries. See YVETTE D’ATH, CTH AUSTL., CARBON 
CREDITS (CARBON FARMING INITIATIVE) (DESTRUCTION OF METHANE 
GENERATED FROM MANURE IN PIGGERIES-1.1) METHODOLOGY DETERMINATION 
(2013); MARK DREYFUS, CTH AUSTL., CARBON FARMING (DESTRUCTION OF 
METHANE GENERATED FROM MANURE IN PIGGERIES) METHODOLOGY 
DETERMINATION (2012). 
 115. See CTH AUSTL., CFI METHODOLOGY: DESTRUCTION OF METHANE 
FROM MANURE IN PIGGERIES—FACT SHEET 1 (2013). Farmers may also be 
eligible to generate renewable energy certificates for use under the Renewable 
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credits earned from methane capture can be sold to liable 
entities under the carbon pricing mechanism for compliance 
purposes, a market opportunity that would not exist in the 
absence of the carbon price.116 
Another development, also much trumpeted by the former 
Gillard government, was the conclusion of an agreement in 
August 2012 with the European Commission to link the carbon 
pricing mechanism to the EU ETS from 2015.117 This linkage, if 
it had come to fruition, would have created the world’s largest 
carbon trading market, with arguably much greater potential 
to drive a clean energy transformation in the participating 
jurisdictions.118 Legislation enacted by the federal parliament 
prior to the election provided for an initial one-way link, with 
Australian liable entities able to use European Unit Allowances 
(EUAs) to discharge liabilities under the carbon pricing scheme 
from July 1, 2015.119 The Gillard government and the 
European Commission had intended to conclude a formal 
agreement on a full two-way link by mid-2015, to commence no 
later than July 1, 2018.120 The Gillard government was also 
reported to be pursuing linkages with other ETS around the 
world.121 Potential candidates included the Californian cap-
                                                          
Energy Target, a scheme that will continue under the Abbott government, 
subject to review in 2014. Id. 
 116. See Pig Farming and Making Money from Carbon Credits, PIGS WILL 
FLY (Nov. 11, 2011), http://www.pigswillfly.com.au/2011/11/pig-farming-and-
making-money-from-carbon-credits/. 
 117. See Press Release, European Comm’n & Greg Combet, Minister for 
Climate Change & Energy Efficiency, Australia and European Commission 
Agree on Pathway Towards Fully Linking Emissions Trading Systems (Aug. 
28, 2012), available at http://www.climatechange.gov.au/ministers/hon-greg-
combet-am-mp/media-release/australia-and-european-commission-agree-
pathway. 
 118. Id. 
 119. See Australian National Registry of Emissions Units Act 2011 (Cth) s 
4 (Austl.), amended by Clean Energy Amendment (International Emissions 
Trading and Other Measures) Act 2012 (Cth) s 4 (Austl.). The Gillard 
government also issued implementing regulations to facilitate the transfer 
and recognition of EUAs in the Australian registry. Clean Energy Regulations 
2011 (Cth) r 6.1A (Austl.). 
 120. European Comm’n & Combet, supra note 117. 
 121. See, e.g., ALEXANDER KOSSOY ET AL., WORLD BANK, MAPPING CARBON 
PRICING INITIATIVES: DEVELOPMENTS AND PROSPECTS 64, 66–71, 71–72 
(2013); Brad Jessup & Katherine Lake, Let’s Link Up: Joining Our Carbon 
Price to California’s, THE CONVERSATION (Jan. 23, 2013, 2:32 PM), 
https://theconversation.com/lets-link-up-joining-our-carbon-price-to-
californias-11701. 
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and-trade scheme,122 the voluntary ETS operating in Japan,123 
South Korea, which recently passed legislation to establish a 
carbon trading scheme starting in 2015,124 and China, which 
has a number of pilot schemes in operation in different 
provinces.125 
It is difficult to predict how linkage of the Australian 
scheme with the EU ETS might have affected the effectiveness 
of the former. Businesses with liabilities under the Australian 
scheme largely welcomed the linkage decision as it opened up 
opportunities to purchase and bank EUAs—currently selling at 
record lows—for future use in the Australian scheme.126 On the 
other hand, the linkage decision would have meant that the 
price of Australian carbon units during the ETS phase of the 
scheme was heavily influenced by the price of EUAs and 
developments in regulation of the EU ETS.127 In addition, as 
part of the linkage agreement, previous price safeguards 
included in the Australian scheme—a price floor and a 
surrender charge placed on international units—were 
removed.128 The unhappy history of the EU ETS carbon price 
added to uncertainty over the impact of linkage on the 
Australian carbon price.129 
                                                          
 122. See Jessup & Lake, supra note 121. 
 123. See KOSSOY ET AL., supra note 121, at 64. 
 124. See id. at 71–72. 
 125. See id. at 66–71. 
 126. See Kristy Campbell et al., Carbon Price Update: Linking the 
Australian and EU Schemes, FREEHILLS (Aug. 30, 2012), 
http://www.herbertsmithfreehills.com/-/media/Freehills/
A300812%2023%2032.PDF; Sue Davidson & Chris Norlen-Holmes, Linking 
the Australian and EU Carbon Markets—An Overview of How, When and 
What This Means for Business, CORRS CHAMBERS WESTGARTH (Apr. 16, 2013), 
http://www.corrs.com.au/thinking/insights/linking-the-australian-and-eu-
carbon-markets-an-overview-of-how-when-and-what-this-means-for-business. 
 127. See DEP’T OF CLIMATE CHANGE & ENERGY EFFICIENCY, CTH AUSTL., 
REGULATORY IMPACT STATEMENT ON INTERIM PARTIAL (ONE-WAY) LINK 
BETWEEN THE AUSTRALIAN EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME (ETS) AND THE 
EUROPEAN UNION EMISSIONS TRADING SYSTEM (EU ETS) 3, 6 (2012); CLIMATE 
CHANGE AUTHORITY, RENEWABLE ENERGY TARGET REVIEW—FINAL REPORT 
27 (2012). 
 128. See European Comm’n & Combet, supra note 117. 
 129. See, e.g., Edwin Woerdman, Stefano Clo & Alessandra Arcuri, 
European Emissions Trading and the Polluter-Pays Principle: Assessing 
Grandfathering and Over-Allocation, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND EUROPEAN 
EMISSIONS TRADING: LESSONS FOR THEORY AND PRACTICE 128, 128–29 
(Michael Faure & Marjan Peeters eds., 2008); Jon Birger Skjaerseth, EU 
Emissions Trading: Legitimacy and Stringency, 20 ENVTL. POL’Y & 
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III. LESSONS FROM THE AUSTRALIAN CARBON PRICING 
EXPERIENCE 
At the international level, the shape of any global climate 
change agreement and associated emissions reduction 
commitments that might emerge from the current round of 
negotiations under the so-called Durban platform remains 
unclear.130 “In this setting, the ‘global carbon market’” for the 
time being is likely to “consist of a number of individual 
domestic, regional and voluntary ETS, each covered by its own 
specific legislation and governance arrangements.”131 Despite 
the emerging regulatory patchwork for GHG abatement, a 
study of individual schemes offers considerable potential for 
deriving lessons for the development of similar schemes in 
other jurisdictions. The Australian carbon pricing mechanism 
itself was designed with close attention paid to the lessons from 
the EU ETS and the experience of other jurisdictions engaged 
in ETS regulation, such as California.132 This Part considers a 
number of key lessons from the Australian scheme for other 
                                                          
GOVERNANCE 295, 295–96 (2010); ETS, RIP?, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 20, 2013, 
at 75. A Commission “backloading” proposal designed to reduce available 
allowances and thereby shore up the price of EUAs was approved on a second 
vote of the European Parliament. See Connie Hedegaard: “Parliament Vote 
Sends a Clear Message that Europe Needs an Effective ETS”, EUR. COMM’N 
(July 3, 2013), http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/hedegaard/headlines
/news/2013-07-03_02_en.htm; Press Release, Point Carbon, Back Loading 
Given Green Light From Parliament (July 3, 2013), available at 
http://www.pointcarbon.com/aboutus/pressroom/pressreleases/1.2445845. 
 130. Marissa Knodel & Omar Malik, Setting the Stage for Climate 
Negotiations, YALE SCH. FORESTRY & ENVTL. STUD. BLOG (Nov. 20, 2012), 
http://environment.yale.edu/blog/2012/11/setting-the-stage-for-climate-
negotiations/; see Rep. on the Conf. of the Parties on its 17th Sess., U.N. 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, Nov. 28–Dec. 11, 2011, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1 (Mar. 15, 2012), available at http://unfccc.int/
resource/docs/2011/cop17/eng/09a01.pdf. The Durban Platform is an 
agreement by UNFCCC parties to launch new negotiations for a universal 
climate change agreement, encompassing the United States as well as major 
developing country emitters. Summary of the Doha Climate Change 
Conference, EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULL. (Dec. 11, 2012), http://www.iisd.ca/
vol12/enb12567e.html. Negotiations are due to conclude in 2015 with the 
agreement to come into effect by 2020. U.N. Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, supra note 130, at 2. 
 131. ZAHAR ET AL., supra note 8, at 177. 
 132. See, e.g., AUSTL. GOV’T PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N, CARBON PRICING 
POLICIES IN KEY ECONOMIES: PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N RESEARCH REPORT     
88–89 (2011), available at http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/
109830/carbon-prices.pdf.; GARNAUT, UPDATE PAPER SIX, supra note 54, at 19. 
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jurisdictions, such as the United States, seeking to develop 
legal and policy reforms to drive the uptake of clean energy 
sources. 
A. THE PRICE MUST BE RIGHT 
Carbon pricing is a market measure designed to 
incentivize the transition away from high-carbon energy 
sources by pricing the environmental externality created by the 
emission of GHGs.133 By putting a price on emitting greenhouse 
pollutants, the aim is to make the use of GHG-intensive energy 
sources more expensive and thereby encourage transition to 
cleaner energy sources, as well as the development of 
technologies designed to reduce emissions.134 During the fixed-
price phase of Australia’s hybrid carbon pricing mechanism, 
the starting carbon price for the 2012–13 financial year was 
twenty-three AUD (roughly twenty USD) per ton of CO2-eq 
emitted.135 While one can imagine U.S. politicians recoiling at 
the thought of a twenty dollar per ton carbon tax, from an 
economic point of view, the level of the Australian carbon price 
was considered, by some analysts, too low to drive a significant 
transition away from fossil fuels in the energy sector.136 Price 
modeling undertaken by Deloitte prior to introduction of the 
scheme suggested the carbon price would need to be “well 
above” thirty AUD to bring about a significant reduction in coal 
use for energy production in Australia.137 In his 2011 Report, 
Professor Garnaut recommended Australia’s initial carbon 
                                                          
 133. See, e.g., Ben Spraggon & Mathew Liddy, Carbon Pricing Explained, 
AUSTL. BROAD. CORP. (ABC) NEWS, http://www.abc.net.au/news/specials
/climate-change/pricing-explained/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2013). 
 134. See KARSTEN NEUHOFF, CLIMATE POLICY AFTER COPENHAGEN: THE 
ROLE OF CARBON PRICING 19–20 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2011). 
 135. Evgeny Guglyuvatyy, Australia’s Carbon Policy: A Retreat from Core 
Principles, 10 EJOURNAL TAX RES. 552, 562 (2012), available at 
http://www.asb.unsw.edu.au/research/publications/ejournaloftaxresearch/Docu
ments/full_edition_v10n3.pdf. On July 1, 2013, the carbon price increased to 
24.15 AUD per ton. It will increase again to 25.40 AUD on July 1, 2014, 
providing the legislation establishing the carbon pricing mechanism is not 
repealed in the interim. Id. 
 136. DELOITTE TOUCHE TOHMATSU, ELECTRICITY GENERATION 
INVESTMENT ANALYSIS, FINAL REPORT 37 (2011), available at 
http://www.ret.gov.au/energy/Documents/Energy-Security/Deloitte-Draft-
Report-on-Electricity-Investment-01.pdf. 
 137. Id. 
2014] AUSTRALIAN CARBON PRICING MECHANISM 453 
 
price be in the range of twenty to thirty AUD.138 Negotiations 
in the Multi-Party Climate Change Committee resulted in a 
political compromise at the lower end of this range: a starting 
carbon price of twenty-three AUD per ton of CO2-eq.139 
In the full ETS phase with a “flexible” carbon price, 
expectations were that the carbon price would decrease rather 
than increase, at least in the short-term.140 Indeed, it is an 
inherent feature of ETS that the carbon price fluctuates in 
response to changes in demand and supply of emissions 
allowances.141 Linkage with the EU ETS was likely to 
exacerbate price variability, as the Australian carbon price 
would have been influenced to a significant extent by the price 
of EUAs, which have been depressed in recent years due to 
problems of oversupply.142 With the scheme’s previous price 
floor of fifteen AUD per ton of CO2-eq also removed, there was 
no limitation to prevent the Australian carbon price falling to 
very low levels.143 
The primary drawback of a “low” carbon price is that it 
may result only in a transition to “cleaner” energy sources, i.e., 
from coal to natural gas, without driving large-scale 
deployment of clean energy technologies to harness renewable 
energy sources.144 Lack of certainty as to the carbon price 
                                                          
 138. GARNAUT, UPDATE PAPER SIX, supra note 54, at 10. 
 139. CTH AUSTL., MPCCC CLEAN ENERGY AGREEMENT 1 (2011), available 
at http://www.climatechange.gov.au/climate-change/multi-party-climate-
change-committee/resources/multi-party-climate-change-committee-clean-
energy-agreement. 
 140. CTH AUSTL., BUDGET OVERVIEW 28 (2013), available at 
http://www.budget.gov.au/2013-14/content/overview/html/index.htm; see 
Treasurer Chris Bowen Confirms Government Will Scrap Carbon Tax for 
Floating Price, AUSTL. BROAD. CORP. (ABC) NEWS (July 15, 2013, 9:25 AM), 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-07-14/federal-government-to-scrap-carbon-
tax/4818980 (reporting that Former Treasurer Chris Bowen acknowledged 
that if the scheme was amended to move to the flexible price period a year 
earlier this would come at a budget cost of several million dollars; this 
estimate was based on the carbon price dropping from 24.15 AUD (fixed price 
for 2013–14) to a floating price expected to be between 6–10 AUD per ton). 
 141. GARNAUT (2008), supra note 27, at 344. 
 142. These problems may be mitigated by the Commission’s backloading 
initiative. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
 143. Frank Jotzo et al., Policy Uncertainty About Australia’s Carbon Price: 
Expert Survey Results and Implications for Investment, 45 AUSTL. ECON. REV. 
395, 399 (2012). 
 144. Id. at 399–400; see also Ben Elliston et al., Least Cost 100% Renewable 
Electricity Scenarios in the Australian National Electricity Market, 59 ENERGY 
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under an ETS, coupled with the problem that the price may fall 
to negligible levels if there is an oversupply of carbon units in 
the scheme, might be seen by some as a reason for preferring a 
carbon tax over an ETS. 
B. POLLUTER PAYS, NOT PAY THE POLLUTERS 
One of the salutary lessons of the EU ETS has been the 
danger of oversupplying the carbon market with emissions 
allowances.145 An oversupply of allowances both depresses the 
carbon price in the market and also inflates the cap, lessening 
the environmental effectiveness of the scheme. A simple way to 
avoid this problem is to allocate all emissions allowances by 
way of auction.146 However, full auctioning of allowances is 
often considered politically unpalatable due to industry 
resistance, coupled with the potential for cost-of-living 
increases as the costs to businesses of purchasing allowances 
are passed through to consumers.147 Where the introduction of 
a carbon price may affect the economic viability of a substantial 
portion of electricity generators (coal-fired), full auctioning of 
permits may also raise energy security concerns.148 A common 
aspect of ETS design has therefore been the provision of free 
permits to some industry sectors to shield them—at least on a 
transitional basis—from the full financial impact of carbon 
pricing.149 Australia’s carbon pricing mechanism followed this 
trend, including substantial provisions for the allocation of free 
emissions permits and other compensation payments to 
existing sources with high emissions.150 Two categories of 
emitters receive assistance under the scheme: entities engaged 
in emissions-intensive, trade-exposed (EITE) activities and 
electricity generators emitting high levels of carbon 
pollution.151 
                                                          
POL’Y 270, 280–81 (2013); Natural Gas-Fired Generation to Fall Two Thirds 
Without Carbon, REPUTEX (Mar. 5, 2013), available at 
http://www.reputex.com/publications/gasgentofall/ (subscription required). 
 145. Woerdman, Clo & Arcuri, supra note 129, at 141–42. 
 146. GARNAUT (2008), supra note 27, at 331–32. 
 147. Id. at 332–33. 
 148. Explanatory Memorandum, Clean Energy Bill 2011 (Cth) paras 
6.189–6.197 (Austl.). 
 149. GARNAUT (2008), supra note 27, at 332. 
 150. Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 148, at paras. 6.1–6.8. 
 151. Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) pts 7–8 (Austl.). 
2014] AUSTRALIAN CARBON PRICING MECHANISM 455 
 
As Professor Garnaut articulated in his 2008 Report, there 
is a reasonable economic case that can be made for assistance 
to EITE industries operating in a global context where there is 
no harmonized carbon pricing regime.152 The lack of a globally 
applicable carbon price can create an economic disadvantage 
for such industries vis-à-vis their competitors and can 
potentially result in “carbon leakage.”153 Border adjustment 
measures levying an equivalent carbon price on imported 
goods,154 or extraterritorial operation of a jurisdiction’s carbon 
pricing requirements,155 might also be used to achieve a level 
playing field between domestic export-oriented industries and 
competitors operating in jurisdictions without a carbon price. 
However, both options present significant problems under 
international trade law.156 The Australian carbon pricing 
scheme adopted a more straightforward approach for providing 
assistance to EITE activities by establishing a system of free 
permit allocation known as the “Jobs and Competitiveness 
                                                          
 152. GARNAUT (2008), supra note 27, at 344–49. 
 153. Id. at 230; JOHN DALEY & TRISTAN EDIS, GRATTAN INST., 
RESTRUCTURING THE AUSTRALIAN ECONOMY TO EMIT LESS CARBON: MAIN 
REPORT (2010); MICHAEL GRUBB & THOMAS COUNSELL, CARBON TRUST, 
TACKLING CARBON LEAKAGE: SECTOR-SPECIFIC SOLUTIONS FOR A WORLD OF 
UNEQUAL CARBON PRICES 1 (2010), available at http://www.carbontrust.com/
media/84908/ctc767-tackling-carbon-leakage.pdf; GARNAUT, UPDATE PAPER 
SIX, supra note 54, at 46–49. 
 154. U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, supra note 25, at 74–77; Roland Ismer & 
Karsten Neuhoff, Border Tax Adjustment: A Feasible Way to Support 
Stringent Emission Trading, 24 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 137 (2007). 
 155. For example, the EU’s aviation rules requiring flights to and from the 
EU to acquit emissions allowances for emissions associated with the flight. 
These rules were upheld by the European Court of Justice but continue to be a 
source of trade concerns. See Case C-366/10, Air Transp. Ass’n of Am. v. Sec’y 
of State for Energy & Climate Change, 2011 E.C.R. I-13833, available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/celex.jsf?celex=62010CJ0366&lang1=en&type=NO
T&ancre=. 
 156. In a domestic context they also raise dormant Commerce Clause 
issues. In terms of problems presented under international trade law, 
imposition of a carbon impost on imported goods or a requirement to purchase 
domestic emissions permits to cover embedded emissions in imported products 
may fall foul of national treatment rules under Article III of the World Trade 
Organization’s General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. See General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194; 
UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME & WORLD TRADE ORG., TRADE AND 
CLIMATE CHANGE: WTO-UNEP REPORT 87–110 (2009), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/trade_climate_change_e.pdf. 
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Program.”157 Some activities with very high carbon costs and 
limited price pass-through capacity (e.g., aluminum smelting) 
receive very high levels of assistance, whereas other 
“moderately” emissions-intensive industries receive lower 
levels of assistance.158 The EITE assistance is intended to taper 
off over time to encourage pollution reduction by the industries 
concerned, and is subject to review by the independent 
Productivity Commission.159 
The rationale for providing assistance to existing coal-fired 
electricity generators is more dubious and has been sharply 
criticized by environmental groups as an instance of “pay the 
polluters.”160 Professor Garnaut also came out strongly against 
inclusion of an assistance package for coal-fired electricity 
generators in the clean energy legislation.161 Under the 
package, generators receive two forms of assistance with a 
combined estimated value of 5.5 billion AUD over six years 
until 2017.162 One-off cash payments totaling one billion AUD 
were made to nine coal-fired generators—including some of 
Australia’s dirtiest power stations—in June 2012.163 
Additionally, as part of the “Energy Security Fund,” coal-fired 
generators are due to receive 41.705 million free carbon units 
over a five-year period (2013–2017).164 A third element of the 
                                                          
 157. Explanatory Memorandum, Clean Energy Bill 2011 (Cth) paras   
5.32–5.54 (Austl.). 
 158. Id. at paras 5.15–5.18. Entities assessed as conducting highly 
emissions intensive, trade exposed activities received 94.5% of their units for 
free in the first year and those conducting moderately intensive activities, 66% 
of their units. The rate of assistance was to decrease by 1.3% per year. Id. 
 159. Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) pt 7, div 5 (Austl.). 
 160. See Tony Mohr, Should We Spend $5.5 Billion on Solutions or 
Pollution?, AUSTL. CONSERV. FOUND. (Oct. 15, 2012), 
http://www.acfonline.org.au/news-media/blog/should-we-spend-55-billion-
solutions-or-pollution; Windfall Profits to Australia’s Dirtiest Power Stations, 
ENV’T VICTORIA, http://environmentvictoria.org.au/windfallprofits (last visited 
Oct. 7, 2013). 
 161. GARNAUT (2008), supra note 27, at 344–45; see Giles Parkinson, 
Garnaut Calls the Generators’ Bluff, CLIMATE SPECTATOR (Mar. 30, 2011, 6:49 
AM), http://www.businessspectator.com.au/article/2011/3/30/policy-politics/
garnaut-calls-generators-bluff. 
 162. COMBET, supra note 2, at 32. 
 163. Generation Complexes Eligible to Receive Energy Security Fund Cash 
Payments, DEP’T CLIMATE CHANGE & ENERGY EFFICIENCY, CTH AUSTL., 
http://archive.is/f0iXw (last updated July 9, 2012). 
 164. Coal-Fired Generator Assistance, CTH AUSTL., CLEAN ENERGY 
REGULATOR, http://www.cleanenergyregulator.gov.au/Carbon-pricing-
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package, known as the “Contract for Closure Program,” was 
designed to buy out 2000 MW of the most highly-polluting 
power generation in Australia.165 However, this program was 
abandoned by the Gillard government in September 2012 due 
to the enormity of compensation being sought by generators 
under the scheme.166 
The allocation of free permits and other assistance to coal-
fired generators under the scheme creates the potential for 
windfall gains if carbon price increases are still passed through 
to electricity consumers. The Energy Security Fund places very 
light requirements on generators in order to qualify for 
assistance, and this assistance is not subject to review.167 
Moreover, as Christensen, Duncan, and Phillips note, the 
legislative formula for the allocation of free carbon units may 
create perverse incentives for existing generators to keep 
operating at full capacity in order to receive the free units.168 
Overall, the assistance program for coal-fired generators 
exemplifies the tension between competing objectives of 
fostering a clean energy transition—based on the principle of 
“polluter pays”169—and energy security concerns, which may 
lead to paying polluters in the energy-generation sector to 
continue to pollute. 
C. THE POLITICS MUST (IDEALLY) BE SUPPORTIVE 
As the debates over industry assistance in Australia 
reveal, carbon pricing is a politically sensitive area subject to 
many competing interests.170 Indeed, carbon and climate 
change policy has been a divisive political issue in many 
                                                          
Mechanism/Industry-Assistance/coal-fired-generators/Pages/default.aspx (last 
updated Sept. 2, 2013); Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) pt 8 (Austl.).  
 165. Contract for Closure, DEP’T OF RES., ENERGY & TOURISM, CTH AUSTL., 
http://www.ret.gov.au/energy/clean/contract/Pages/ContractforClosure.aspx 
(last updated Sept. 25, 2012). 
 166. Id. 
 167. See Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) ss 177–180 (Austl.); Caripis et al., 
supra note 49, at 601. 
 168. Sharon Christensen et al., Regulation of Emissions Under the Carbon 
Pricing Mechanism: A Case Study of Australia’s Coal-Fired Electricity Sector, 
15 ASIA PAC. J. ENVTL. L. 17, 23 (2012). 
 169. See PHILIPPE SANDS & JACQUELINE PEEL, PRINCIPLES OF 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 228–29 (3d ed. 2012) (stating that the 
polluter pays principle indicates that the costs of pollution should be borne by 
the person or entity responsible for causing pollution). 
 170. Christensen et. al., supra note 168, at 1. 
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countries, including the United States.171 Efforts to transform 
fossil fuel economies to low-carbon economies often encounter 
strong resistance from entrenched fossil fuel industry interests 
and other lobby groups.172 Consequently, GHG emissions 
reduction schemes such as ETS have rarely been able to be 
established and maintained without bipartisan political 
support.173 The Australian experience unfortunately bears out 
this political truism. 
The path to introducing a carbon pricing mechanism in 
Australia was a politically perilous one. Dubbed the “killing 
fields” of Australian politics,174 failed carbon pricing policies 
have seen the fall of Australia’s three most recent prime 
ministers (John Howard, Julia Gillard, and Kevin Rudd)175 and 
one leader of the Opposition party (Malcolm Turnbull).176 The 
former Prime Minister Gillard, whose government was 
responsible for passage of the clean energy legislation 
establishing the carbon pricing mechanism, became deeply 
unpopular in the electorate, in part because of the “broken” 
pre-election promise not to introduce a carbon tax.177 Dire 
polling for the Gillard government in the lead-up to the 
September 2013 federal election resulted in an internal party 
vote in June to reinstate Kevin Rudd as the new (old) leader of 
the party.178 This change did not save the Rudd/Gillard 
                                                          
 171. See Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: 
Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 
1155, 1180 (2009); Aileen McHarg, Climate Change Constitutionalism? 
Lessons from the United Kingdom, 2 CLIMATE L. 469, 471 (2011). 
 172. McHarg, supra note 171, at 470. 
 173. Id. at 472, 476. 
 174. James West, How the Carbon Tax Became the ‘Killing Fields’ of 
Australian Politics, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 6, 2013, 4:00 PM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/sep/06/election-2013-carbon-
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 175. Prime Minister Howard lost the federal election to Kevin Rudd in 
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the September 2013 federal election. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Before the election, Prime Minister Rudd indicated he supported the 
carbon pricing mechanism although he promised to bring forward the floating 
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government, which was soundly defeated at the election by the 
conservative Coalition party led by Tony Abbott.179 The new 
prime minister has made his government’s “first order of 
business” the repeal of the clean energy legislation and 
dismantling of the supporting institutional infrastructure.180 
Already the Abbott government has disbanded the independent 
Climate Change Commission and ordered the Clean Energy 
Finance Corporation—which provides co-financing for 
renewable energy projects—to cease making loans.181 
Legislation to repeal the carbon price and disband institutions 
such as the Climate Change Authority is currently before, and 
will need to be passed by, the federal parliament.182 This may 
take some time, given the make-up of the Senate until July 1, 
2014, when the newly-elected senators take their seats. Even 
so, the future of the clean energy legislation looks grim: 
“Australia’s carbon pricing mechanism might enter history as 
one of the best-designed yet shortest-lived policies for climate 
change mitigation.”183 
Anticipating political opposition to the scheme and future 
attempts to repeal the underpinning legal framework, the 
Gillard government included in the clean energy legislation a 
number of features designed to embed the scheme in 
Australian federal law. While these features are not likely to be 
sufficient to withstand determined efforts by the Abbott 
government to repeal the legislation, they have what Aileen 
McHarg has termed, “constitutionalist” elements that may 
serve to counteract short-term political and economic 
                                                          
price period of the scheme by one year (to July 1, 2014). See Spraggon & 
Liddy, supra note 133. 
 179. West, supra note 174. 
 180. See Clarke & Greene, supra note 19. 
 181. See Tom Arup, Abbott Shuts Down Climate Commission, THE AGE 
(Sept. 19, 2013), http://www.theage.com.au/federal-politics/political-
news/abbott-shuts-down-climate-commission-20130919-2u185.html; Lenore 
Taylor, Clean Energy Finance Corporation Could Sue over Coalition 
Shutdown, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 18, 2013, 10:08 PM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/19/clean-energy-finance-corp-
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 182. The principal repeal legislation is the Clean Energy Legislation 
(Carbon Tax Repeal) Bill 2013 (Cth) (Austl.) and the Climate Change 
Authority (Abolition) Bill 2013 (Cth) (Austl.). 
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imperatives designed to reduce the ambition of mitigation 
actions.184 
One example of such a feature is the designation of carbon 
units under the scheme as “personal property.”185 This goes 
against the trend in ETS, which have tended to create 
emissions permits as something less than property in order to 
avoid possible takings issues if permits are later revoked.186 
The decision to make carbon units a form of property seems to 
have been taken with an eye to making dissolution of the 
scheme and revocation of units a more politically difficult, and 
potentially expensive, option for later governments.187 In a 
similar way, revenue generated by the scheme has been used to 
fund a range of beneficial income tax changes and household-
assistance payments for low-income earners likely to be 
particularly impacted by cost-of-living changes associated with 
                                                          
 184. McHarg, supra note 171, at 469; see also Lazarus, supra note 171, at 
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 185. Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) s 103 (Austl.). 
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practitioners and scholars have written about the compensation and political 
issues associated with repealing the scheme. See Fergus Green, Abbott’s Gory 
Pledge Would Be a Legal Bloodbath, CRIKEY (Oct. 3, 2011, 1:04 PM), 
http://www.crikey.com.au/2011/10/13/abbotts-gory-pledge-would-be-a-legal-
bloodbath; Andrew Macintosh, Abbott Has Pledged to Repeal the Carbon Tax—
But Could It Be Done?, THE CONVERSATION (July 2, 2012, 6:39 AM), 
http://theconversation.com/abbott-has-pledged-to-repeal-the-carbon-tax-but-
could-it-be-done-7986; George Williams, Opinion, Abbott Courts Trouble with 
Carbon Tax Plans, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Oct. 26, 2011, at 13, available 
at http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-opinion/abbott-courts-
trouble-with-carbon-tax-plans-20111025-1mi0d.html. But see Focus: Now for 
the Direct Action Plan, ALLENS LINKLATERS (Sept. 9, 2013), 
http://www.allens.com.au/pubs/cc/focc9sep13.htm. 
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introduction of an economy-wide carbon price.188 The changes 
made in this regard would be difficult to unwind by any 
incoming government seeking to repeal the associated clean 
energy legislation. Indeed, in his reply to the May 2013 federal 
budget, then Opposition Leader Tony Abbott conceded that the 
carbon tax compensation package would remain in place under 
a Coalition government, albeit that the rationale for such 
compensation would disappear if the carbon pricing scheme is 
removed.189 
The carbon pricing mechanism also contains features that 
allow it to self-perpetuate, even in the advent of an 
unsupportive government. For example, the legislation 
contains default cap-setting provisions so that, if the 
government fails to make regulations to set a cap for the 
scheme, the scheme will continue on an emissions reduction 
trajectory towards the 2020 target of a five percent reduction 
from 2000 levels.190 In the short term, continuation of the 
scheme without active support from the government is a real 
possibility. Control of the federal Senate does not presently rest 
with the Coalition, and even after July 1, 2014, the Abbott 
government will need to negotiate with a variety of minor 
parties and independent senators for the passage of legislation, 
which may result in delays in its efforts to repeal the clean 
energy legislation. In the meantime, independent institutions 
such as the Climate Change Authority and Clean Energy 
Regulator look set to continue their work. While this can hardly 
be described as an optimal way to design long-term climate 
change mitigation policy it may nonetheless represent a 
practical response in order to “restrai[n] the present to liberate 
the future.”191 
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D. CARBON PRICING IS NOT A PANACEA: THE NEED FOR A 
REGULATORY MIX 
As discussed in Part II, above, a preference for market 
mechanisms to address emissions reduction has been a 
leitmotif of Australian climate policy development. In other 
environmental areas, Australia has also been an enthusiastic 
supporter of market measures for addressing a variety of 
environmental and energy issues, including water allocation 
and electricity generation and distribution.192 Unlike the 
United States, there has consequently been no serious 
consideration of direct regulation as an alternative basis for 
Australian climate law. Attempted legislative interventions 
along these lines—such as mooted federal GHG emissions 
standards for new power generators similar to those under 
development by the U.S. EPA—never made it past the policy 
proposal stage in Australia.193 The new Abbott government has 
promised to replace carbon pricing with a policy of “direct 
action,” but this will not involve new regulatory measures.194 
Instead, the lynchpin of Direct Action is an Emissions 
Reduction Fund to be used to purchase emissions abatement 
via a “reverse auction” (i.e., bids for the lowest-cost projects will 
receive funding first).195 
Against this background of a strong preference for market 
measures, influential voices in the development of Australia’s 
climate policy initially advocated the view that introduction of 
a carbon price would remove the need for other existing clean 
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energy measures at the state and federal levels.196 As in the 
United States, these measures encompass a plethora of 
regulations directed to promoting renewable energy uptake and 
improving energy efficiency.197 At the federal level, the most 
prominent measure is the Renewable Energy Target (RET) 
scheme, which aims to increase the deployment of renewable 
energy by twenty percent by 2020.198 In his 2008 Report, 
Professor Garnaut stridently argued for phasing out the RET 
following the establishment of an ETS in Australia.199 The 
Report stated: “No useful purpose is served by other policies 
that have as their rationale the reduction of emissions from 
sectors covered by the trading scheme.”200 
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The underlying rationale of the Garnaut approach is that 
an effective and sufficiently broad carbon price will allow the 
market full rein to direct emissions reduction efforts to the 
least-cost option without interference or distortion by 
government interventions.201 Nonetheless this pure market 
approach contrasts with the practice in other jurisdictions that 
have introduced an ETS—such as the EU and California. In 
both cases ETS form part of a suite of regulatory measures 
designed to support a clean energy transition.202 This 
“regulatory mix” approach, if well designed, may offer 
advantages over a “single instrument” approach by enhancing 
flexibility, resilience and allowing for the strengths of one 
mechanism to compensate for the weaknesses of another.203 In 
an environment of political uncertainty over the direction of 
climate policy, a redundancy in regulatory measures across or 
between different levels of governance may also provide a form 
of insulation against political vicissitudes and market 
uncertainties.204 
                                                          
 201. GARNAUT (2008), supra note 27, at 353. 
 202. Gunningham & Sinclair, supra note 15, at 50. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Tim Bonyhady, The New Australian Climate Law, in CLIMATE LAW IN 
AUSTRALIA 8, 24–26 (2007); Lazarus, supra note 184, at 1206. In practical 
terms, some of the previous concerns about overlapping regulatory 
requirements in Australia’s federal system have abated with the roll-back of 
state climate laws and policies. A prominent example is amendments made to 
Victoria’s Climate Change Act 2010 to remove the Act’s emissions reduction 
target and scale back regulatory powers to address GHG emissions. See 
Climate Change and Environment Protection Amendment Act 2012 (Vic) 
(Austl.). These changes were ostensibly made on the basis that a national 
carbon price emphasizes the need for consistent intergovernmental policies. 
See VICTORIAN GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE CLIMATE CHANGE ACT 
REVIEW 3–4 (2012), available at http://www.climatechange.vic.gov.au
/__data/assets/pdf_file/0010/136486/CCAREV-Report_online.pdf. In reality, 
transitions to conservative governments, in many states, have seen state 
governments back away from progressive climate change policies and actions. 
This is particularly the case in eastern seaboard states such as Queensland, 
New South Wales, and Victoria. For example, in Queensland, the Premier has 
declared “we are in the coal business.” Kathleen Donaghey & AAP, Premier 
Campbell Newman Will Not Halt Port and Industry Development on 
Queensland’s Coast to Protect Great Barrier Reef, COURIERMAIL.COM.AU (June 
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In any event, there had been recent indications in 
Australia that the view that carbon pricing should be the sole 
and central policy for addressing domestic GHG emissions was 
shifting in favor of a more pluralist approach. The Gillard 
government’s clean energy policy package—while giving a 
central role to the carbon pricing mechanism—envisaged a 
range of other supporting measures for renewable energy, 
energy efficiency, and carbon sequestration in the land sector 
(e.g., the CFI).205 In the area of land use and planning, there 
has long been resistance to the idea of subjecting development 
proposals with significant GHG emissions to federal 
environmental assessment and approval requirements under 
the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 
1999 (Australia’s equivalent of the National Environmental 
Policy Act).206 Despite this, in June 2013 the federal parliament 
passed an amendment instituting a new assessment “trigger” 
for coal seam gas207 or “large” coal mining developments with 
significant impacts on water resources.208 
In its review of Australia’s RET scheme, the Climate 
Change Authority also cautiously endorsed a continuing role 
for complementary policy measures such as the RET.209 The 
Authority particularly emphasized the benefits that the RET 
might offer in mitigating the risk that uncertainty over the 
carbon price (in Australia and internationally) suppresses 
investment in low-emissions technologies.210 Consequently the 
Authority concluded: “In the current policy environment, the 
RET can be seen as being complementary to the carbon price, 
as a transitional measure, while a carbon price is being 
established, its future becomes more certain, and price levels 
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adjust to reflect Australia’s long-term emissions reduction 
goals.”211 Perhaps even more telling was Professor Garnaut’s 
submission to the review, which reversed his long-held view 
that the RET should be phased out. Instead Garnaut argued for 
retention of the RET on the basis that “acceptance of the 
Renewable Energy Target by both sides of partisan politics in 
Australia means that it can now provide a more secure basis 
than politically-contested carbon pricing for emissions-reducing 
investments in the electricity sector.”212 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Early experience with the carbon pricing mechanism in 
Australia suggests legal and policy reforms to institute market 
measures directed to GHG emissions reduction have 
considerable potential to drive an economy-wide energy 
transformation. In addition, the common carbon commodity 
created under an ETS facilitates linkage with similar schemes 
in other jurisdictions, potentially laying the groundwork for a 
transnational carbon market. Nonetheless, the effectiveness of 
an ETS as a measure to drive clean energy uptake is heavily 
dependent upon a robust carbon price. Problems of oversupply 
of carbon units, overly-generous industry support provisions 
that allocate many free permits, and political uncertainty over 
the future of climate policy can weaken the carbon price, and 
hence the effectiveness of an ETS in contributing to a clean 
energy transition. Such problems lend support to the notion 
that an ETS or carbon price should only ever be one piece of the 
regulatory puzzle adopted for addressing climate change and 
clean energy challenges. 
At the time of writing, the Australian carbon pricing 
mechanism, and clean energy policies more broadly, confront 
many uncertainties. In the short term, a key concern is 
whether the carbon pricing scheme will continue, with the most 
likely prospect being repeal of the underlying legislation by the 
incoming Abbott government. Prior to the federal election, 
political uncertainty over the future of the scheme had already 
paralyzed the domestic carbon market, with institutional 
investors, in particular, reluctant to participate.213 Australian 
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businesses will now need to respond to yet another iteration of 
carbon policy as the Abbott government moves to add 
regulatory flesh to the bones of its Direct Action policy. 
Despite the short-term prospects for the Australian carbon 
pricing mechanism, big emitters continue to view some form of 
carbon pricing as likely to reemerge in the medium-to-long 
term. In a 2012 study of expectations about climate change 
laws conducted by the Australian National University’s 
Crawford School of Public Policy, forty percent of the liable 
entities, carbon financiers, and scheme experts interviewed 
expected the carbon pricing mechanism to be repealed, but only 
twenty percent thought there would not be a carbon pricing 
scheme in Australia by 2020.214 These results “pu[t] the 
spotlight back on to the uncertainty that is dominating the 
area.”215 Such uncertainties significantly complicate 
investment decisions in the energy sector, which tend to plan 
on a thirty-year, rather than a three-year electoral time 
horizon. From this perspective, the strongest prospects for 
instituting a “clean energy future” in Australia and elsewhere 
lie in a stable carbon pricing scheme with independent 
supporting institutional infrastructure designed to ensure the 
credibility and environmental integrity of the scheme over 
time. Unfortunately for Australia, this prospect now seems out 
of reach. 
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